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6.1  Introduction 
The collapse of the U.S. savings and loan industry is one of the major eco- 
nomic developments of  the 1980s.’ Current official estimates of the cost to 
American taxpayers of resolving failed thrift institutions exceed $300 billion 
over the coming decade. Some knowledgeable observers contend that even 
that figure is optimistically low.2 
There has been a torrent of analysis of the thrift debacle. Much of this work 
has focused on the debacle’s economic underpinnings. These economic fac- 
tors include the adverse interest-rate environment facing savings and  loan 
(S&L) institutions at the beginning of the decade, particularly when coupled 
with the imbalance in maturities of S&L assets and liabilities. In mid-decade, 
the collapse of real estate markets in the oil patch and hard times in the farm 
belt had a devastating impact on S&Ls in those areas. Federal deposit insur- 
ance provided what has amounted to a government-backed guarantee that en- 
couraged many thrift institutions to hold increasingly risky assets as their net 
worth declined. Low capital requirements further encouraged a type of risk- 
taking behavior that has been characterized as “gambling for resurrection.” In 
a number of spectacular cases, outright fraud and theft have occurred. 
The American thrift industry, like the financial services sector in general, 
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has been highly regulated for the last half-century. The events of  the 1980s 
have called into question the effectiveness of the regulatory structure and per- 
formance. Many of those who have explored the economic aspects of the S&L 
crisis have at least alluded to regulatory failures. Though some have noted 
links to the political process generally and to congressional politics in partic- 
ular (see, esp., Kane  1989a, 1989b, 1989c), there has been no  systematic 
treatment of the political underpinnings of the crisis. 
In this essay, we are concerned with documenting these political aspects of 
the thrift debacle by focusing on the role of elected officials. We contend that, 
although the industry did face severe economic shocks during the decade, 
political action-and  inaction-played  an important role in shaping the en- 
vironment in which thrift institutions and regulators operated. The regulatory 
structure in place at the beginning of the decade was itself a political creation. 
Its key  elements-such  as deposit insurance, portfolio restrictions, capital 
requirements, resources available to regulators-were  politically determined. 
Any changes in these elements in response to changing economic environ- 
ments would also be subject to political forces. 
Other writers have detailed the escalating costs associated with delay and 
regulatory forbearance in the face of mounting problems in the thrift industry 
during the second half of the decade (see, e.g., Brumbaugh and Carron 1987; 
Brumbaugh 1988; Barth and Bradley  1988; Brumbaugh, Carron, and Litan 
1989; Kane  1989a,  1989b,  1989c; Scott  1989a). We  argue that  Congress 
was  the major source of  regulatory forbearance during the crucial period 
1985-87. 
Our analytical perspective centers on the institutional structure of congres- 
sional decision making and on incentives faced by  individual congressmen. 
These incentives led to interventions by some legislators on behalf of constit- 
uents (individuals and thrift institutions) to urge regulatory relief.  System- 
wide, they also resulted in delay in recognizing the magnitude of the problems 
facing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Con- 
flicting interests across key committees of the House and Senate-under  dif- 
ferent party control during the first six years of  the decade-also  militated 
against timely, corrective legislation. 
In 1981, 85% of the approximately 3,750 thrift institutions insured by the 
FSLIC had negative earnings (Barth and Bradley 1988). This was the worst 
of  a series of  increasingly unprofitable years for the industry. More signifi- 
cantly, the 1979-81  surge in interest rates had wiped out the industry’s net 
worth, as measured by  current market value.3 Even by the more lenient stan- 
dards  of  generally  accepted  accounting  principles  (GAAP),  there  was  a 
marked deterioration in the financial health of thrift  institution^.^ The FSLIC 
was faced by a record number of problem thrifts. The regulatory response was 
to merge or liquidate only some of the worst cases and to allow many insol- 
vent thrifts to remain open. 
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Garn-St  Germain Depository Institutions Act  passed by  Congress in  late 
1982. This legislation had as its primary goal the partial deregulation of the 
financial sector. It expanded the scope of activities permitted to thrift institu- 
tions, and it broadened the type of assets that they could hold. It also relaxed 
regulatory accounting standards for  thrift^.^ Over the next two years, as inter- 
est rates declined, it appeared to many observers that the crisis was over.6  The 
number of  thrifts that received direct or indirect FSLIC assistance fell (see 
table 6.1). 
As is now well known, 1983 through early 1985 was just the calm before 
the storm. By  late 1985, Edwin Gray, chairman of  the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board (FHLBB), testified before Congress that FSLIC would require 
$14-$15  billion  in  additional funds to handle newly emerging problems. 
When Congress passed legislation nearly two years later, the magnitude of the 
thrift solvency crisis had grown to an estimated $50 billion. Yet  the 1987 leg- 
islation provided only $10.8 billion in additional FSLIC funding, less than 
regulators had requested in 1985. The problems of the thrift industry contin- 
ued to mushroom, so that by the time new legislation was once again consid- 
ered in 1989, the scope of the liabilities facing FSLIC and American taxpayers 
had exploded to $200 billion. 
In  this essay,  we  focus on  the  issue of  how  the  thrift problem of  the 
mid-1980s transformed so quickly. It is widely recognized that a major factor 
in the magnitude of  the problem has been the behavior of  insolvent thrifts. 
The structure of deposit insurance gave insolvent but open thrifts (what Ed- 
ward  Kane has called “zombie” institutions) strong incentives to undertake 
high-risk investments. If the investments turned sour (as many of them did), 
thrift owners had little or nothing to lose-the  institution was already insol- 
vent anyway. The additional losses would eventually have to be covered by 
FSLIC, whose ultimate guarantors were the taxpayers. If, on the other hand, 
the investment paid off, the thrift might be able to lift itself out of insolvency, 
with the positive returns going to the thrift’s owners. This systematic “gam- 
bling for resurrection” has meant that, except in the extremely unlikely event 
Table 6.1  Attrition among FSLIC-Insured Thrifts, 1980-84 
FSLIC-  Assisted  FSLIC 
Supervisory  Voluntary 
Year  Liquidations  Mergers’  Mergers  Mergers  Total 
1980  0  11  24  82  117 
1981  1  21  53  206  287 
1982  1  69  182  262  5 14 
1983  6  47  49  107  209 
1984  9  18  14  33  79 
Source: Brumbaugh (1988, table 3-2). 
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that most of the gambles were to pay off, the cost of the eventual resolution of 
the debacle would grow dramatically. 
Gambling for resurrection may well have been largely responsible for the 
explosive growth of the thrift problem. But why was such gambling allowed? 
Why did regulators not stop it? Given the rapid growth in the problem, why 
was Congress so slow to respond? Why was the 1987 legislation too little, too 
late? 
Several hypotheses have emerged to address these questions. Some argue 
that  the regulators  were  incompetent and  failed  to  do their job.  Had  the 
FHLBB only been more attentive to what was going on in the industry, for 
example, it could have abated the crisis when it was much smaller. A second 
argument suggests that fraud by greedy thrifts hid the problem from view. A 
third explanation suggests that the thrifts, through intense lobbying and large 
campaign expenditures, were able to sway key congressmen to violate “ethi- 
cal practices” by intervening in the regulatory process on behalf of  the thrifts.’ 
Although each of these hypotheses is partially correct, they all miss the key 
element in the foundations of the thrift debacle. Massive gambling for resur- 
rection was allowed to proceed because Congress intervened in the regulatory 
process to establish and enforce a policy of forbearance. This policy, initiated 
at the start of  the decade, was later expanded in two ways. First, by delaying 
FSLIC recapitalization (partly by  design and partly for other reasons, dis- 
cussed below) and by keeping recapitalization to low levels, Congress ensured 
that regulators could force only some insolvent S&Ls to close or reorganize. 
Second, the FHLBB was generally on the side of forbearance. When regula- 
tors did propose to embark on a tougher policy, Congress intervened to pre- 
vent enforcement of existing rules and, through new legislation, relaxed many 
regulatory provisions. Moreover, in many respects, Congressional behavior 
with respect to the thrift industry should be seen as fairly routine politics, 
rather than as an outrageous deviation. We  emphasize the role of Congress 
over that of the president because the latter generally adopted a more passive 
stance, reinforcing rather than counterbalancing congressional initiatives fa- 
voring ailing thrifts. While the president in principle might have attempted to 
oppose a policy of forbearance, he did not do so. 
Our thesis, then, is that the way Congress handled the emerging thrift crisis 
fits into a more general pattern of the way Congress responds to constituencies 
and to regulatory developments. Relatively routine behavior during 1985-87 
generated both delay in legislation and the reinforcement of forbearance that 
allowed thrifts to gamble for resurrection. 
To establish this thesis, we begin by summarizing a framework that encom- 
passes the relationship between a regulatory agency and Congress and de- 
scribes how bureaucratic policy choice comes systematically under congres- 
sional influence (sec. 6.2). We  then shift to a more specific discussion of the 
regulatory environment of the thrift industry circa 1985 (sec. 6.3).  This sets 
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changing economic environment and the regulators’ proposals to deal with it 
(sec. 6.4). This narrative is useful, not primarily because it tells an intriguing 
story, but because it shows how legislative response fits into the framework 
we have outlined. As part of  the discussion of  the  1986-87  legislation, we 
provide some econometric evidence about the connection of constituent inter- 
ests to congressional behavior. In section 6.5, we summarize our findings and 
draw some lessons we think are applicable to other potential debacles. 
6.2  Congress, the President, and the Regulatory Bureaucracy 
Because many of the strongest effects of politicians occur through indirect 
mechanisms that are not easily observed, the relationship between elected of- 
ficials and the ongoing process of regulatory decision making is often misun- 
derstood. In this section, we present a framework for the analysis of regula- 
tory policy-making. We  begin with the role of Congress, and then we turn to 
the president.B 
We  start with the premise that congressmen are motivated in large part to 
seek reelection-certainly  other goals, such as implementing good policy, re- 
quire reelection. This motivation forces congressmen to respond to the inter- 
ests in their districts. But this does not mean that constituents’ interest are 
weighed in a uniform way. Rather, weights accorded different interests reflect 
the degree to which particular interests within the district attend and respond 
to the actions of a congressman. Since most individuals have only the vaguest 
notion of their congressman, the main challenge of a congressman is to break 
through the information barrier. According to Mayhew (1974, 74), “A suc- 
cessful congressman builds what amounts to a brand name,” and empirical 
studies repeatedly show that name recognition is valuable on election day.9 
The problem of building sufficient recognition to succeed on election day 
leads congressmen to focus on two types of  activities: constituency service 
and national policy issues (Fiorina 1989). Constituency service includes a 
wide range of activities, which can be grouped into two categories. First, this 
service entails the congressman’s securing his district its share of governmen- 
tal  expenditures-highway  funds,  a  new  post  office,  urban  development 
grants, sewage treatment facilities, and so on. Also in this category is direct 
service to individuals and groups, ranging from helping individuals find their 
lost Social Security checks to intervening in regulatory proceedings on behalf 
of  prominent district interests. Congressmen serve as ombudsmen on behalf 
of  their constituents before a host of  regulatory agencies. The large pres- 
ence of the federal government in the economy implies that the opportunities 
to play this role are numerous, and this ombudsman activity typically consti- 
tutes a major portion of a congressman’s efforts. Moreover, the federal system 
of regulation is designed to be open to the influence of congressmen (Fiorina 
1981; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins et al.  1989), as we  will 
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The second form of activity in which every member of Congress engages 
in order to develop a favorable reputation involves specialization in the policy- 
making process. This is most effectively done through the work of congres- 
sional committees. The committee system effectively divides the large set of 
national public issues into jurisdictions and assigns policy areas by jurisdic- 
tion to specific committees. This affords congressmen the ability to specialize 
on issues that relate to their constituents by obtaining membership in a com- 
mittee with a policy jurisdiction that is important to the constituency. Because 
few congressmen can credibly claim a key role in major new legislation, the 
committee system affords opportunities for many members to specialize and 
build a reputation for expertise and influence in a specific area. 
6.2.1 
The literature on congressional institutions demonstrates that they play a 
key role in determining the specific form of policy outcomes. Recent work 
has aimed at formalizing the relationship between institutional structure and 
policy.l0  For our purposes, what is most relevant is that these institutions set 
up multiple veto points, that is, positions within the institution that can readily 
delay or prevent legislation on a specific topic from becoming law.  A major 
implication of veto power is that it endows relevant legislators with the ability 
to protect the interests they represent. Attention to the key veto points goes a 
long way toward understanding policy choice. 
Committees are by  far the most important veto points because each com- 
mittee plays a strong role in shaping policy within its jurisdiction. Part of  a 
committee's power arises from gatekeeping-the  ability to keep legislation 
from coming to a vote by  the full House or Senate. Exercising such veto 
power usually requires the support of the committee chairman and a majority 
of the committee. Put another way,  opening the gates typically requires that 
the committee chairman and a majority of committee members expect to ben- 
efit from the legislation. If the legislation will only make them worse off, then 
the veto power will be exercised. Committees rarely bring their bills before 
the entire chamber unless they have the support of  a majority. Hence most 
bills succeed once they get to the floor; that is, once they come up for a vote. 
In summary, then, committees are powerful because they have a fundamental 
role in  shaping the legislative agenda as well as the substantive content of 
legislative proposals. 
If committees are the most important veto points within Congress, they are 
hardly the only ones. The bicameral structure of  Congress implies that any 
legislation must attain majority support in  both the House and the Senate. 
While obvious, this condition can be hard to satisfy when the houses are of 
different parties, as in 1981-86,  when the Democrats held a majority in the 
House and the Republicans a majority in  the Senate. In  addition, in  each 
chamber there are players other than committee members who may be relevant 
for particular issues. In the House, the leadership, in  the  1980s, played a 
The Role of Congressional Institutions 181  Political Foundations of  the Thrift Debacle 
strong role in scheduling and passing legislation.’2 In the Senate, individuals 
may hold up legislation by filibustering at strategic moments. 
Constituency interests represented by congressmen at key veto points gain 
an advantage in the policy process. Veto power usually assures these interests 
that legislation will not make them worse off (otherwise it will never make it 
past the veto point). Though floor majorities, the leadership, and other well- 
placed individuals such as the president often play important roles, an under- 
standing of committees and their leaders remains central to the analysis of 
policy formation. 
6.2.2  Congressmen and their Constituents 
In order to understand the legislative preferences of congressmen, we need 
to know the types of constituencies they face (Fenno 1978; Moe 1989). The 
relationship between congressmen and their constituents can be divided into 
several politically relevant subcategories. The first is a congressman’s entire 
district, that is, his “legal constituency.” More relevant, however, are a con- 
gressman’s supporters within the district who provide resources and votes. 
These include organized interests such as environmentalists, labor unions, 
firms, and trade associations. Congressmen are especially attentive to the ac- 
tive interests within their districts, and this attention provides the basis for the 
commonly observed geographically based dispersion of interests in Congress 
(representatives from farm states are advocates of farm benefits; those from 
cities are advocates of funds for local highways and urban redevelopment). 
Another subgroup consists of those with a potential interest in some policy, 
but who not only lack an organization, they are nearly completely inattentive 
and can be mobilized only with great difficulty. A good example are individu- 
als who are induced, through dairy price supports, to pay too high a price for 
milk. Were they politically active, they might counterbalance milk producers’ 
influence over policy that maintains prices. More generally, taxpayers rarely 
organize to oppose a specific increase in revenue for some political purpose or 
to oppose a new loophole. Only on occasion can such a politically latent 
group play a major role in politics. 
A final set of constituents relevant for a congressman comes from outside 
the district. These constituencies usually have interests that fall within the 
jurisdiction of  a committee on which the congressman serves. This rarely 
causes congressmen to favor organized interests outside the district over ac- 
tive interests within the district. The typical pattern is for a congressman to 
receive money and support from groups whose interests are compatible with 
those in his district or for which the district is inactive or indifferent (Denzau 
and Munger 1986). 
In what follows we use the terms “constituents”  and “constituency” to refer 
to those active interests (whether organized or diffuse, inside the district or 
out) that play a role in a congressman’s support coalition. Hence we exclude 
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man’s  group of  supporters. For any given issue area, legislative preferences 
of relevant congressmen, especially those positioned at key veto points, must 
be assessed. This requires focusing on their constituency pressures, typically 
by examining the various active and potentially active constituencies likely to 
be interested in the issue. 
6.2.3  The Relationship of Regulatory Agencies to Congress 
Because regulatory agencies affect a broad range of  interests, it would be 
surprising to find politicians without the means to  influence their decisions. 
While  direct  attention  through  hearings,  investigations,  and  policy  pro- 
nouncements is relatively sporadic, there are many other, often more effective 
devices for political influence. These include a complex incentive system that 
rewards agencies that follow political intentions and punishes those that do 
not. The routine process of regulatory oversight does not involve systematic 
congressional intervention. A regulatory agency attuned to congressional in- 
terests (particularly those represented on relevant committees) will rarely de- 
viate in such a way as to incur congressional ire. Such deviations, when they 
occur, can damage an agency and its leaders-resulting,  for example, in the 
removal of  an issue from an agency’s jurisdiction, cutting off funds, or ruining 
a regulator’s political career. Because of such costs, agencies tend to be atten- 
tive to the relevant congressional constituents (Ferejohn and Shipan 1989). 
Direct  intervention,  then,  is  episodic and  relatively  unusual,  not  because 
congressional influence is weak,  but because direct congressional attention 
and participation is required only when agencies go astray.  l3 
The structure of congressional institutions assures that committees with ju- 
risdiction over a regulatory agency’s policy area play a major role in the agen- 
cy’s fate. It is these committees that handle new legislation and respond to 
problems with agency performance. Two types of changes in the regulatory 
environment tend to attract considerable attention by  the relevant congres- 
sional committees: (1) a change in the economic environment that threatens 
the regulated industry, and (2) an attempt by an agency to alter the regulatory 
status quo. In the case of the thrift industry both of these took place. 
6.2.4 
In general, the president is concerned about reelection, his party’s pros- 
pects,  and his reputation long after he leaves office-his  place in history. 
These factors lead him to take a wider view of policy issues than do congress- 
men. Like congressmen, the president is strongly affected by  active constitu- 
encies. In contrast to congressmen, however, the president’s electoral base is 
necessarily larger. Where congressmen can focus on a narrow segment of the 
national picture, the president must respond to a broader perspective. 
The president is therefore more likely to look beyond active interest groups 
to reach the larger public. Because he commands national attention, the pres- 
ident can potentially transform the politics of certain policy issues. For a small 
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set of issues-typically  those highest on the presidential agenda-the  presi- 
dent can sometimes mobilize the nation against narrow, active interests. But, 
because he does have limited resources, a president typically husbands his 
time and effort to those areas of  high concern to him where the effort will 
make a difference. As regards regulation, the president has the institutional 
capacity to monitor and influence on-going regulatory policy (Moe 1985b). 
This capacity can be deployed to limit attempts by an agency to change policy 
course in a manner that hurts presidential interests. 
6.2.5  Implications for Regulatory Policymaking 
The implications of  this view of regulatory politics are as follows. First, 
congressmen on the relevant committees play important roles for ongoing pol- 
icy decisions within a regulatory bureaucracy. Even though congressmen may 
not be attentive, members of  their active support constituency are. Because 
congressmen collaborate with these constituents to intervene when regulatory 
agencies seek to deviate from the constituents' interests, regulators pay close 
attention to these interests. Intervention by politicians usually means trouble 
for bureaucrats, and it is widely agreed that agencies seek to avoid it. If  an 
agency presses on in  spite of congressional opposition, congressional inter- 
vention usually follows. The main lesson for regulatory policy-making is that, 
in a confrontation between a congressional committee (i.e., committee chair 
and a supportive committee majority) and an agency, the committee usually 
prevails. 
Second, politicians have a variety of  strategies available to them for influ- 
encing agencies. Actual legislation is usually not necessary for Congress to 
get the agency to change co~rse.'~  This allows congressmen to play the role 
of ombudsman on behalf of their constituents in a way that is not particularly 
visible to outsiders. When faced with a conflict between regulators and con- 
stituents, congressmen nearly always side with their constituents. 
Third, when examining a particular regulatory policy initiative, we  should 
distinguish between the actors implementing  policy and the political forces 
that led to the policy. Too often, students of regulation presume that because a 
regulatory agency initiates a policy without explicit instructions from politi- 
cians, the agency-and  not the politicians-must  be responsible for the pol- 
icy change. By the framework we outlined above, this inference is incorrect 
because it ignores the political forces working on the agency. 
Frequently, one can find good evidence of congressional influence by com- 
paring agency proposals with what actually happens, whether through legis- 
lation or an agency's implementing a revised proposal. An example is useful 
here. In studying the 1960s policy initiatives of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), many  scholars provided explanations in  terms of  the 
agency itself, focusing especially on the preferences of  new  SEC leaders.I5 
Weingast (1984) showed that, in fact, the SEC had been proposing these ap- 
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presidential and congressional ears and went nowhere. Only when new offi- 
cials in the White House and on the relevant Senate committee began to favor 
these initiatives were they actually implemented.  l6 
Fourth, the lineup of constituency interests facing congressmen on the rel- 
evant committees, members on the floor, and the president is an important 
foundation for regulatory policy choice. When only one interest is active, it 
tends to dominate policy choice, often at the expense of a much larger group 
of inactive individuals. When several constituencies are relevant, policy tends 
to be  a compromise among them.  But here,  too,  such compromises often 
come at the expense of inactive interests. 
Fifth, presidential action can provide a counterweight to the congressional 
tendency to  favor narrow  but  active  constituencies.  Such  action typically 
comes only when it is consistent with the overall administration agenda (and 
does not significantly conflict with the interests of constituencies that form an 
important part of the president’s support). Because his resources are limited, 
a president usually plays this role only when issues of the highest priority are 
involved. 
Sixth, when policy initiatives backfire, politicians often blame bureaucrats. 
This rhetoric is part of the system itself. Because the influence of Congress on 
the bureaucracy is subtle and not readily known, Congress can rail against the 
very bureaucracy it created (Fiorina 1981). Moreover, as Kane (1989b) em- 
phasizes, legislation is often constructed so as to give politicians considerable 
scope to obscure the lines of  authority to the bureaucracy. Since the public 
holds regulators responsible for a host of policy problems, the bureaucracy 
becomes a convenient whipping boy. 
6.3  The Thrift Problem and the Relevant Constituency Interests 
6.3.1  Background of the Regulatory Environment 
To put the events of the eighties in proper perspective, a brief sketch of the 
political setting of  the thrift industry is useful. Many thrift institutions were 
formed between the world wars by real estate, construction, and development 
companies as a natural adjunct to their other activities. The regional Federal 
Home Loan Bank system was established in 1932 to provide for thrift institu- 
tions the services that commercial banks obtained through the Federal Reserve 
System. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was 
established in  1934 as part of  a political compromise to gain the support of 
thrift institutions for Roosevelt’s National Housing Act.  The FSLIC was 
placed under the supervision of the FHLB Board. 
The linkage between the housing industry and the thrift industry was a po- 
litically potent force in the decades following World War 11. Much of the ar- 
gument for the special status of thrifts was based on the premise that a strong 
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in turn,  required favorable treatment to assure a healthy market for residential 
mortgages.  l9 
The geographic dispersion of the thrift industry-with  firms in nearly every 
congressional district-has  meant that when the industry required congres- 
sional attention, it could usually get it. Through the 1970s, the industry was 
quite homogeneous in its interests. Consequently, its trade association, the 
U.S. League of Savings Associations (later renamed the U.S. League of Sav- 
ings Institutions), was able to marshal considerable agreement on policy mat- 
ters and to “speak with one voice” to regulators and politicians. Indeed, the 
league was so effective in making its views known that its name was nearly 
always accompanied in newspaper accounts by the adjectives “powerful” and 
“influential.” 
The relative homogeneity of the industry also worked to its direct advantage 
with  the relevant congressional committees and  hence with  the  industry’s 
chief federal regulator, the FHLBB. Forces tending toward “capture” of a reg- 
ulatory agency by the industries it regulates are magnified when the regulated 
interests are themselves not in conflict. The absence of conflict among con- 
stituents led to an FHLBB that in many ways has looked like the paradigmatic 
captured agency:  responsive for the most  part to thrift industry interests, 
promulgating regulations that would increase industry rents, staving off com- 
petition from unwelcome poachers from commercial banking. Congress sup- 
ported these policies both  with  active legislation, and-more  generally- 
simply by not opposing them.*O 
As a response to the straitened economic circumstances  faced by the indus- 
try at the beginning of the 1980s, the Garn-St  Germain Act of  1982 loosened 
restrictions on thrifts’ activities. This helped to provide the  industry with 
greater scope to make investments and compete for deposits. As the adverse 
interest-rate environment of  the early 1980s receded, the apparent health of 
the industry improved. Encouraged by spokesmen for the thrift industry, most 
members of Congress were ready to believe that legislation in  1982, coupled 
with regulatory actions from then on, had succeeded in handling the problems 
that had surfaced at the beginning of the decade. 
During this time, there is little evidence that the FHLBB disagreed with the 
policy of  forbearance. Indeed, a case can be made that warning signs about 
the looming losses embedded in many thrift balance sheets were systemati- 
cally downplayed, both by  industry groups and by  the regulators.2’  The ac- 
counting rules adopted by FHLBB pursuant to the guidelines of the Garn-St 
Germain Act made this possible. The gambles of insolvent thrifts, made with 
at least tacit regulatory approval, were backed by congressional mandate. 
6.3.2  The Administration and the Emerging Thrift Crisis 
The administration’s domestic policy stance centered on reducing the scope 
of government activity, including an emphasis on holding down nondefense 
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implications. First,  the  administration strongly supported the deregulatory 
components of the 1982 legislation. It looked at thrift regulators with a some- 
what jaundiced eye, at least when it came to the question of bank examination 
and supervision. Second, to the extent that dealing with the thrift problem 
required infusions of  government funds, the administration preferred not to 
acknowledge the problem. In part, this reflected the administration’s desire to 
avoid any explicit new revenue requirements. In part, it was due to the recog- 
nition that any attempt by the administration to gain revenue for one purpose 
would require compromise with administration opponents seeking funds for 
their own favored programs. Third, by late 1986, deferring action on the full 
scope of the thrift problem allowed the administration to focus on other policy 
goals as the Reagan presidency approached its end. 
A minority voice within the administration recognized the problems inher- 
ent with the system of  deposit insurance in a deregulated environment. The 
1984 Economic Report of  the President contained a recommendation by the 
Council of  Economic Advisers (CEA) that the deposit insurance system be 
reformed because of  the adverse incentives it created. The  1986 Economic 
Report  of  the President, published in February, devoted a chapter to “The 
Federal Role in Credit Markets,” which gave a succinct explanation of  the 
thrift problem as of  late  1985-including  the risks posed by  “gambling for 
resurrection.” The CEA also sounded a warning that FSLIC’s problems could 
turn into a potential liability for taxpayers and again called for deposit insur- 
ance reform. 
The economists’ position was not reflected in the administration’s policy. 
The president continued to support further deregulation of financial markets, 
but there were no  initiatives to deal specifically with  the problems of  the 
thrifts.22  A policy  of  forbearance was consistent with  the three factors we 
listed above. Any other path would have been in conflict with the administra- 
tion’s highest priorities. From the perspective of  1985 and  1986, the stakes in 
the thrift issue did not appear substantial enough to compromise those priori- 
ties. The administration thus withheld support from thrift regulators not only 
when they attempted to enforce capital requirements but also for new revenue 
that might have provided an early and much smaller recapitalization of  the 
thrift insurer than would prove necessary later on. Action by  the Office  of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to limit FHLBB budget requests (see below) 
was consistent with this stance. 
6.3.3 
While the scope of  thrifts’ lending activities-and  hence their asset-risk 
exposure-increased,  the  resources  devoted  to  monitoring  thrifts’  health 
stayed constant or actually declined. Table 6.2 shows that FHLBB examina- 
tion and thrift supervisory budgets were roughly constant from 1982 through 
1984, whether measured in numbers of  people or dollars. Yet,  during this 
time, industry assets grew by 50%. Arguing that the growth in the industry 
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Table 6.2  FHLB  Regulatory Resources and Thrift Industry Assets 
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required greater regulatory resources, the FHLBB requested a significantly 
increased budget for 1985. This was rejected by  the Office of  Management 
and Budget as unjustified, given the administration’s overall stance on regu- 
lation as well as its desire to limit government spending. 
Even peering through the distorting lenses of  regulatory accounting prac- 
tices, it was  becoming apparent to the regulatory agency in  1985 that the 
gambles of  many insolvent thrifts would probably result in heavy losses for 
FSLIC. A report by FHLBB economists in July 1985 estimated that the pres- 
ent value of the costs associated with dealing with resolving thrifts that were 
insolvent at the end of  1984 would be over $15 billion. At the time, FSLIC 
had assets of  $5.5 billion. At a Senate Banking Committee hearing, Edwin 
Gray “emphasized that [the report] painted a worst-case scenario which was 
very unlikely to occur.” Senators Jake Garn (R-Utah,  the committee chair- 
man) and William Proxmire (D-Wisconsin,  ranking minority member) con- 
curred.  23 
The FHLBB did take some steps to increase its regulatory resources. Hav- 
ing been rebuffed by OMB, the agency decided in mid-1985 to decentralize 
its examination activities by  shifting personnel to the district Federal Home 
Loan Banks. This ploy allowed the FHLB budget to increase, since the district 
banks’ budgets were not subject to OMB review. The last three years’ entries 
in table 6.2 reflect this administrative  shift by the agency. 
By the fall of 1985, thrift insolvencies  were mounting at a rate that alarmed 
even the FHLBB. Edwin Gray’s announcement in October 1985 that FSLIC 
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clear signal of a change in regulatory position. Gray’s change from his stance 
earlier was driven to a large extent by  knowledge within the agency that dis- 
aster was impending-FSLIC  was clearly going broke. If nothing were done, 
Gray and the agency would be blamed. Blame might be avoided if the prob- 
lem were urgently brought to public attention. The FHLBB chairman testified 
to Congress that were the board to resolve cases immediately, the deposit in- 
surance fund would run out of money within a year. 
6.3.4  Congressional Response 
The Reagan administration’s decision to remain in the background on the 
thrift issue left Congress as the major player. In looking at congressional re- 
sponse to these developments, two elements should be emphasized. First, it is 
not unusual for an agency to cry ‘‘wolf‘’-a  crisis is emerging-and  claim 
that if  its budget is not increased dramatically, life as we know it cannot go 
on. Why, in a given instance, would congressmen believe the alarm? For the 
case of  the S&Ls, had not the  1982 legislation fixed the problem? In what 
sense was there a new problem? Even congressmen without a special-interest 
axe to grind may well rationally react with skepticism to the new tune being 
sung by regulators. 
The second element relevant to the emerging crisis was the fiscal austerity 
of  the mid-1980s. In times of  budgetary constraint, nearly all congressmen 
had to face constituents who wanted funds for existing programs increased, 
without the political wherewithal for added revenues. To the extent that new 
resources for the FSLIC or the FHLBB were to come in the form of  newly 
funded budget authority, these resources would probably have to come at the 
expense of  competing programs.  To  refuse valued, long-term constituents 
while creating a large new program would be politically difficult. Congress- 
men (and the president) would thus be reluctant to address any problem with 
big fiscal requirements unless there were large political rewards to be gained. 
Since the  nature  and  potential  proportions of  the  problem  were  not  well 
known, these rewards were likely to be small. 
To  understand the nature of the political costs and benefits associated with 
new legislation, we turn to the lineup of interests on this issue. 
(I  j The ThriJt Industry 
A key feature of the economic developments in the industry over the 198 1- 
87 period is the growing disparity between the healthy thrifts and those that 
were  not  doing  well.  Table  6.3 shows  that  the  gap  between  the  worst- 
performing institutions (those in the 5th and 10th percentiles of the industry, 
as measured by  after-tax income) and the ones doing best (those in the 90th 
and 95th percentiles) widened enormously from 1983 to 1987. 
As figures 6.1 and 6.2 show, there was also a geographical segmentation of 
the industry, with some regions having particularly heavy concentrations of 
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Table 6.3  Net After-Tax Income of FSLIC-Insured Thrifts (annualized, 
percentage of  Average Assets) 
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relevant generally. But, perhaps more important, figure 6.2 reveals that the 
immediacy of the concern would be manifest more clearly to legislators in the 
southwest and parts of the farm belt than to those in other parts of the country. 
These effects eventually led to a divergence of interests within the industry, 
but in a way that had both segments of the industry supporting only limited 
help for FSLIC. 
Troubled Thrifts.  Troubled S&Ls would seem to be the most likely source of 
active support for legislation to resolve the problems in the industry. There 
was indeed active support-but  not for increased regulatory activity. Instead, 
these thrifts, and especially the U.S.  League of  Savings Institutions, argued 
for continued forbearance, so that weak and insolvent thrifts could grow out 
of their current problems, much as they were claimed to have done in 1983. 
They were opposed to increasing deposit insurance levies to generate more 
funds for the FSLIC. Generally, they supported a limited recapitalization for 
FSLIC. This would provide the insurance fund with some resources to handle 
the worst cases, but not allow it to move aggressively against many insolvent 
institutions. 
Healthy Thrifts. These firms recognized that allowing FSLIC to fail would 
create depositor uncertainty that would harm even the healthy thrifts, so they 
preferred some recapitalization over doing nothing. Obviously, healthy thrifts 
would have liked to shift to taxpayers as much of the cost of resolving failed 
institutions as possible.25  But they also recognized that to expect a recapitali- 
zation totally  financed by  taxpayers was  unrealistic.  At  least initially, in- 
creases in FSLIC capital would have to be financed in large measure by  in- 
creased assessments on the industry. If the sick thrifts did not get better, these 
assessments would have to be borne by the segment of the industry that had a 
positive cash flow. The larger the FSLIC recapitalization, the larger the cost to 190  Thomas Romer and Barry R. Weingast 
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the currently healthy firms-except  in the highly unlikely event that many of 
the zombies were indeed resurrected. A recapitalization large enough to cover 
all likely losses by  zombie thrifts, if  borne by  the healthy members of  the 
industry, would wipe out most of the healthy thrifts’ profits and a substantial 
portion of  their net worth. So, from the healthy thrifts’ viewpoint, a large 191  Political Foundations of  the Thrift Debacle 
recapitalization, drawing mostly on industry funds, was not necessarily better 
than doing nothing. This group was therefore inclined to support a modest 
recapitalization on the order of $5 billion. 
(2) Depositors 
The clear preference of account holders was to ensure that the various guar- 
antee schemes-thrifts  backed by  FSLIC and FSLIC backed by the govern- 
ment-worked  as promised. This system of  pledges removed the incentives 
for this group to monitor the institutions that held their deposits. While depos- 
itors were likely to react quite strenuously if these pledges were threatened, 
they were unlikely to play an active role in the choice among different alter- 
natives for honoring the pledges. 
Where there were relatively heavy concentrations of failing thrifts, the im- 
mediacy of the problem would be more apparent to depositors. In such areas, 
the concerns of depositors could be strong enough to register on the political 
seismograph. This effect would pull  a congressman’s preferences toward a 
higher FSLIC capitalization, providing a countervailing force against the in- 
terests of the troubled thrifts. 
(3)  Taxpayers 
Taxpayers, of course, were the most diffuse constituency. Because of this 
diffusion, only a few issues ever become sufficiently salient to play a role in 
the mass politics of taxation. In the short run, this group simply prefers lower 
taxes. While in principle it may have an interest in spending more money 
today to avoid spending much more money tomorrow, in practice politicians 
can act on this principle only if  they can credibly claim credit for actually 
having saved the money tomorrow. Such claims typically look like rationali- 
zations for boondoggles for some other group and are usually avoided by pol- 
iticians. Prior to the crisis becoming common knowledge, therefore, it was 
unlikely that politicians could claim credit for saving future taxes by big ap- 
propriations today. 
While there is a clear overlap between the last two groups, their interests 
are not identical. Not  all taxpayers have significant deposits at thrift institu- 
tions. Because depositors are a subset of all taxpayers, they prefer policies 
that secure their deposits while spreading the costs over the much larger group 
of taxpayers.  For depositors, especially large ones, the benefits in making 
deposits more secure outweigh their share of the increase in taxes. 
This discussion suggests that there was little initial support, outside of  a 
small group of experts, for developing a legislative solution that covered the 
full scope of  the thrift problem.  While  in  late  1985 the problem was  big 
enough to demand some attention, it was not recognized to be large enough to 
generate sufficient public attention that there were large political rewards from 
a  major  new,  expensive policy.  A  recapitalization that  would  have  given 
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would, by late 1986, have required a $50 billion program. This level of fund- 
ing was totally outside the scope of anything that could be financed from as- 
sessments on the industry. It would require a significant commitment of  tax- 
payer resources.26 
It must be emphasized that, while regulators and a small group of experts 
were warning of dire things to come, no significant group was mobilized to 
support a large-scale recapitalization. Congressmen were faced with a situa- 
tion in which the lineup of  interests was largely against the high levels of 
recapitalization called for by  some regulators. In such a situation, congress- 
men did not need elaborate rationalizations to follow their legislative prefer- 
ences and side with their constituents. 
6.3.5  Committee Jurisdictions and Other Interests 
In the Senate, the jurisdiction over thrifts is assigned to the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, while in the House the similarly named 
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs deals with these matters. 
As their names suggest, the domain of  these committees is extensive, and 
includes a large variety of  issues beyond the S&L industry. Not  only were 
other financial markets and regulatory agencies within their realms, but so too 
were such diverse policies as housing and even some aspects of international 
development. A common occurrence in the legislative process is that mem- 
bers of committees with legislative interests in one policy area must negotiate 
with other members of the committee whose interests lie elsewhere, often in 
policy issues that are logically unrelated except that they come under the pur- 
view of the same committee. This politically induced interdependence among 
issues may have a strong effect on legislation aimed at a particular problem 
because the fate of one policy may be tied to political circumstances involving 
other, possibly unrelated issues. 
An ongoing matter of concern for both of these committees throughout the 
1980s was the question of  deregulation of commercial banks. A particularly 
contentious issue involved the entry into banking of nonbanking institutions, 
such as Sears and American Express. The regulation of such “nonbank banks” 
did not directly involve most of the problems confronting the thrift industry. 
But, in a larger sense, a case could be made that the health of the thrift indus- 
try was linked to the overall competitive environment of the banking sector. 
In any event, over the  1986-87  period,  these issues became linked in the 
political process. 
6.4  The Politics of Legislative Delay and Forbearance, 1986-87 
In this section we examine the legislative consideration of a response to the 
regulators’ signal that all was not well and that a major change in policy would 
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ture of congressional decision making provides a road map through the events 
of the two years following Gray’s October 1985 testimony. The trail to follow 
in this narrative is the one laid out by our framework: attention to players at 
key veto points and their role in structuring the legislative agenda. 
6.4.1  The 1986 Stalemate 
The reaction by  the two committee chairmen to the emergence of  a new 
thrift problem differed in ways that foretold conflict: St Germain (D-Rhode 
Island, chairman of the House committee) called for extension of the  1982 
legislation and  opposed further financial deregulation. In  contrast, Senate 
committee chairman Garn  announced that  he  was  “vitally committed” to 
broad  financial deregulation. He  planned to use  the yet undrafted bill  to 
strengthen the FSLIC system as a vehicle for banking deregulation. As will 
become clear, Garn was not alone in this sentiment. Thus, St Germain, at least 
initially, sought a bill that focused on the thrift problem. Garn’s interest fo- 
cused on deregulation of the financial system and saw the legislation on the 
thrifts as a potential vehicle. 
In the early spring of  1986, a plan emerged to finance the recapitalization 
of  FSLIC. The FHLBB proposed to tighten regulations concerning thrift in- 
vestments and accounting standards, arguing that half a decade of permissive- 
ness had done much harm. The new rules would require thnfts, among other 
things, to double their capitalization to 6% of assets in six years and to replace 
the current accounting conventions that, according to the board, had obscured 
the emerging problems. By early May, the proposed plan would raise suffi- 
cient funds to cover deposits in the (then) estimated 216 failing thrifts. 
Proceedings in the Senate began when Garn introduced an omnibus bank- 
ing bill that included provisions for dealing with thrifts and other problems. 
Shortly thereafter, however, he dropped the additional provisions as his com- 
mittee passed a bill with FSLIC provisions nearly identical to those in  the 
House.  Nonetheless, William  Proxmire, ranking  minority member of  the 
committee, threatened to filibuster unless other, unrelated aspects of bank reg- 
ulation-especially  the issue of  the nonbank banks-were  dealt with at the 
same time. In late September, the House committee joined this measure with 
political alternatives of  its own, especially additional authorization for some 
housing programs, hoping to use the FSLIC recapitalization as a vehicle to 
move other legislation. 
Before a vote on the House floor could be taken, however, majority leader 
Jim Wright of Texas (who would soon succeed Tip O’Neill as Speaker) re- 
moved the bill from the House calendar. Texas bankers and real estate devel- 
opers had complained to Wright that regulators were restricting real estate 
loans and refusing to restructure bad loans. The bill was not rescheduled until 
Edwin Gray met with Wright and assured him that regulators would cooperate 
with ailing thrifts in Texas. By holding the legislation sought by  regulators 194  Thomas Romer and Barry R. Weingast 
hostage, this intervention compelled an agreement by  the regulators not  to 
enforce their own rules against ailing thrifts-assuring  an expanded de fact0 
policy of forbearance, at least for politically favored institutions. 
Shortly thereafter (October 1986),  the House passed its measure. The house 
bill created a new financing corporation with the authority to borrow up to $15 
billion over three years, to be used to fund FSLIC. Only a limited amount of 
new FSLIC resources would come from extra assessments on thrifts. Like the 
regulators, legislators also proposed changes in  the regulatory restrictions. 
But instead of increasing the stringency with which insolvent thrifts were reg- 
ulated, legislators weakened the position of regulators vis-2-vis the zombies. 
Regulators were given expanded powers, not to force failing banks to close, 
but to keep them open until new  owners could be found or the hoped-for 
resurrection took place. 
On the Senate side, the final bill called for only $3 billion in FSLIC recapi- 
talization and did not  include housing provisions that St Germain strongly 
favored. St Germain had earlier indicated that he would not accept any com- 
promise that excluded the housing issues. At this point a stalemate occurred. 
None of the policies preferred by  House members at key  veto points (i.e., 
policies calling for funds for FSLIC and housing, but without provisions deal- 
ing with commercial bank regulation) were acceptable to key veto players in 
the Senate (who supported lower FSLIC recapitalization without the housing 
provisions but with the commercial banking matters) and vice versa. With the 
congressional session ending before the 1986 elections, there was insufficient 
time to resolve the differences between the Senate and House versions. Both 
bills died.  27 
The end-of-the-session rush combined with strategies by several politicians 
to link the thrift issue to other issues. Even a partial resolution of the growing 
thrift problem was thereby delayed for nearly a year. Part of the explanation 
for the intransigence of the relevant committee members in both chambers is 
that those with strong constituency interests were inclined toward lax regula- 
tion. Since, for the most part, thrifts were arguing for forbearance, delay 
would ensure greater laxity by forcing the regulators to wait for needed funds. 
Committee members with relatively few weak thrifts in their state (such as 
F’roxmire of Wisconsin) did not have a compelling interest in raising substan- 
tial revenues for FSLIC but were interested in other banking issues. Finally, 
there was the general unwillingness by many congressmen to find the FHLBB 
warnings of  impending doom to be credible, given the longstanding appear- 
ance (buttressed by regulatory accounting practices and the claims of the thrift 
constituency) that the thrift problem was at worst a temporary and regional 
one.  28 
A year of legislative deadlock was not without its legacy. Though no legis- 
lation had  passed, the regulators’ direct interaction with Wright and other 
members of  Congress from  states with  many  problem  thrifts  (especially 
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future attempts to deal with the thrift problem would involve large doses of 
forbearance. 
6.4.2 
With the Democrats’ recapture of a majority of Senate seats after the 1986 
elections, the chairmanship of  the  Senate committee passed to  Proxmire. 
Within a month of the elections, he announced support for a plan drafted by 
the administration that would have permitted up to $15 billion in borrowing 
authority for a FSLIC recapitalization. But he intended to include this in an 
omnibus bill (S 790) that also placed a moratorium on the creation of new 
nonbank banks. 
The U.S. Savings League lobbied aggressively against the $15 billion re- 
capitali~ation.~~  They argued against its costs and supported a much weaker 
proposal that would have allowed for a temporary $5 billion funding authority. 
This proposal would also have continued and even extended regulatory for- 
bearance toward insolvent thrifts in “economically distressed” areas. In this 
way,  the League proposal combined the forbearance measures sought by  the 
sick thrifts and the limited funding that the healthy thrifts preferred. 
As approved by the Senate Banking Committee, S 790 limited FSLIC bor- 
rowing to $7.5 billion over two years, with no more than $3.75 billion to be 
spent in either year.30  The bill also included forbearance provisions for thrifts 
in  economically depressed areas. Attempts to increase the borrowing limit 
were rejected by the committee. Most of the debate in the committee focused 
on issues relating to the nonbank bank matter and other financial sector regu- 
latory questions, such as the entry of  commercial banks into the securities 
industry. 
Bill S 790 was approved on the Senate floor 79 to  11 without significant 
change in the FSLIC financing provisions. An attempt by  Garn to strike the 
non-FSLIC-related matters from the bill to provide a “clean” recapitalization 
bill failed by a vote of 35 to 54. The committee bill also contained a provision 
that would have exempted bank regulatory agencies (including the FHLBB) 
from any automatic Gramm-Rudman-Hollings cuts. Approving an amend- 
ment by  Gramm (R-Texas)  by  a voice vote, the Senate stripped this provi- 
sion from the committee bill. In so doing, the Senate made clear that addi- 
tional funds for FSLIC would be subject to the general fiscal restraints of the 
time. 
On the House side, St Germain had signaled early on that he would refuse 
to permit a bill to reach the House floor with the nonbank bank provision, and 
his committee prepared its own version of the legislation (HR 27). As to the 
message that the bill would send to regulators, Speaker Wright had met with 
committee Democrats, and, according to news reports, “Mr. Wright in effect 
said, no forbearance, no bill” (New  York Times, 9 February 1987). 
As it appeared in the markup session of  the Financial Institutions Supervi- 
sion, Regulation and Insurance Subcommittee  of the House Banking Commit- 
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tee, HR  27 was essentially the bill supported by  the U.S.  Savings League. 
The major issue of debate was the level of recapitalization. On a 23 to 20 vote, 
the subcommittee approved an amendment to raise FSLIC’s borrowing limit 
from $5 billion over two years to $15 billion over five years, with a limit of 
$3.5 billion on borrowing in any given year. The next day (1 April 1987) the 
full committee reversed this action, and approved, 25 to 24, an amendment 
sponsored by Stephen Neal (D-North  Carolina) to return to the $5 billion, 
two-year plan.  Amendments to increase the recapitalization to $12 billion 
over four years or $10.5 billion over three years were rejected. The committee 
then voted 45 to 5 to report HR 27, with the two-year $5 billion plan, and 
including many forbearance provisions. 
FHLBB chairman Gray attacked the committee bill because, in contrast to 
the measure the committee had passed in 1986, it included many new forbear- 
ance provisions.  He noted  that these were pushed by  “some of  the worst- 
managed thrifts” in order to “hamstring” regulators. Proponents of  HR  27 
explicitly argued that its main goal was indeed to put regulators “on a short 
leash” (Washington Post, 29 April 1987). 
6.4.3  The St Germain Amendment 
As FSLIC’s cash woes mounted, toward the end of  April, Speaker Wright 
made the surprise announcement that he would favor increasing the capitali- 
zation to $15 billion, though with the forbearance provisions of the committee 
bill  left intact.  Speculation about Wright’s  motives included his increasing 
concern about adverse media coverage of his connection with some spectacu- 
lar Texas thrift failures and indications that the $5 billion package would fail 
on the House  St Germain joined Wright in this reversal and announced 
that he would sponsor an amendment to raise the FSLIC borrowing limit to 
$15 billion-but  retain the forbearance provisions-when  HR  27 came to a 
House vote. 
The U.S.  Savings League lobbied vigorously against St Germain’s pro- 
posed amendment. Healthy thrifts were particularly concerned about the ad- 
ditional assessments that the higher borrowing limit would impose on them. 
When the St Germain amendment came to a vote in the House (May 5),  it lost 
by a resounding 153 to 258.32  The leader of the floor fight against the amend- 
ment was Neal, who put the issue in the following terms: “The argument is 
between more money and less oversight [of the regulators by  Congress] and 
less money and more oversight” (Wall Street Journal, 6 May 1987). 
We  conducted a simple econometric analysis of voting on the St Germain 
amendment to examine our hypothesis that the opposition of healthy thrifts 
played an important role in defeating the amendment. We  obtained data on 
the number of FSLIC-insured thrift institutions falling into each of five GAAP 
capital/asset ratio categories in each state.33  We  constructed two variables, 
WEAK and STRONG.  The former is the number of  thrifts in the state with nega- 
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worth above 3% of GAAP assets. Both variables were measured as of  year- 
end  1986.” We  then divided each variable by the number of  congressional 
districts in the state to get an admittedly crude measure of  the constituency 
pressure  on  each  member.  (Ideally, we  would  have  liked  these  data by 
congressional district, but these were not available to us.) The resulting vari- 
ables are WEAKDIS and STRONGDIS, respectively. 
As another thrift constituency variable, we constructed PACMONEY, which 
measures the campaign contributions received (in thousands of  dollars) by 
each congressman from the largest thrift industry PACs in the 1983-84  and 
1985-86 election cycles.35 
To capture purely partisan effects, we used party affiliation (a dummy vari- 
able PARTY, which equals 1 for Democrats and 0 for Republicans). Another 
variable,  IDEOL, is intended to capture a congressman’s general legislative 
preference with respect to government intervention. The variable IDEOL is 
computed from scaling of the roll calls and legislators in  the  100th House 
using the NOMINATE procedure of Poole and Rosenthal (1991). This variable 
ranges from approximately + 1.3 to approximately -  1.3, with high values 
corresponding to “liberal”  positions and  low  ones to  “conservative” posi- 
tions.  36 Including IDEOL allows for within-party variation according to indi- 
vidual constituency or representative characteristics that are not captured in 
our economic variables. Finally, we allowed for the possibility that members 
of  the committee behaved differently than nonmembers by  including COM, 
which equals 1 for committee members and is 0 otherwise. 
We  estimated the probability of observing a “yea” vote on the St Germain 
amendment. Using probit analysis, we estimated 
(1)  P = Prob (yea vote) = F(Z), 
where F (.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution. Our specification 
of Z is given by: 
(2)  z = Po + P, PARTY -t p,  IDEOL  + p, COM  + P,  PACMONEY 
-I-  P,  STRONGDIS  + p6  WEAKDIS. 
Based on our earlier discussions, we expect (3,  to be negative. To the extent 
that “liberal” overall legislative preferences are also “proregulation,” we  ex- 
pect P,  > 0. Since the St Germain amendment was supported by the admin- 
istration, Republicans would be more likely to be in favor of  it, so we expect 
The committee had, of  course, reported the $5 billion package, but this 
amount had been approved in committee by a one-vote margin. The commit- 
tee chairman was now sponsoring an amendment to raise the recapitalization 
level-a  switch from the way he voted in committee. This does not imply any 
clear prediction about P3,  but if committee members tend to support the chair- 
man’s position on the floor (as part of  an implicit bargain in a continuing 
relationship), then we should see p, >  0. 
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The predicted sign of  p,  is negative if  WEAKDIS is primarily a measure of 
constituent pressure from insolvent thrifts. But,  as we  noted in our earlier 
discussion, having a larger number of  insolvent thrifts in one’s district also 
heightens depositors’ concerns in  the district. This may lead to increasing 
willingness to vote for a larger recapitali~ation.~’  The net effect on p,  is un- 
clear. 
As to p4,  it would be natural to suppose that higher contributions from the 
thrift  PACs  would  be  associated with  a lower probability  to  vote  for  the 
amendment. But studies of the relationship of campaign contributions to vot- 
ing on individual roll calls have shown no clear indication of such direct as- 
sociation. 
Table 6.4 presents our probit estimates. As  expected, Republicans were 
more likely to vote for the amendment than Democrats-and  liberal Demo- 
crats (there are no Republicans with high IDEOL values) were more likely to 
vote yea than their more conservative brethren. Committee members were 
more likely to favor the amendment, ceteris paribus, than nonmembers (in- 
deed, committee members voted 30 to 18 in favor3*).  Money from PACs does 
not  appear to have  had  a  significant, independent association  with  voting 
yea.  39 
We  see that the coefficient on STRONGDIS is negative and quite precisely 
estimated in all the specifications. Both the estimated coefficient and its stan- 
dard error are insensitive to which of the political variables are included in the 
specification. We  can say with some confidence, therefore, that the probabil- 
ity  of  voting against raising the  FSLIC borrowing  limit was  significantly 
Table 6.4  Voting on the St Germain Amendment to HR 27, Robit Estimates 
(N = 411) 
1  2  3  4  5 
Constant  .287  ,014  -.I30  .081  -  ,134 
PARTY  -  1.225  -  ,250  -  1.164 
(.303)  (.130)  (.291) 
IDEOL  ,819  -  .011  ,778 
( ,228)  ( ,099)  (.217) 
COM  ,728  ,675  ,679  .756  .680 
(.227)  (.  224)  (.223)  (.  2w  (.222) 
PAC  M  0  N  E  Y  ,037  ,042  ,038  ,038 
(.@w  (. 040)  (.  040) 
(.029)  (.029)  (  .029)  (.029) 
(.071)  (.068)  ( ,069)  (.068) 
(.199)  (.182)  (. 168)  (.142)  (.I@) 
STRONGDIS  -  ,072  -  ,078  -  ,077  -  .077 
WEAKDIS  ,130  ,060  .060  .061 
In likelihood  -  251.45  -  258.04  -  259.87  -  255.92  -  259.88 
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Table 6.5  Probability of Yea Vote on St Gerrnain Amendment to HR 27 
Low  High  Low  High 
Means  STRONGDIS  STRONGDIS  WEAKDIS  WEAKDIS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Democrat at median 
Republican at median 
Democrat IDEOL  .305  ,414  ,192  ,258  ,397 
Republican IDEOL  ,394  .510  ,265  .341  .492 
Note: Computations are based on estimates in column (1) of table 6.4. (a)  For all computations, 
COM  = 0. (b)  Median  IDEOL for Democrats  = 0.745. (c) Median IDEOL for Republicans = 
-0.456.  (d)  Maximum value of IDEOL = 1.34;  minimum value of IDEOL = -  1.41. (e)  Col. 1: 
Economic  variables  at  their means:  PACMONEY  =  1.112, STRONGDIS  =  5.032, WEAKDIS  = 
1.087. Col. 2:  STRONGDIS  =  1 and PACMONEY and WEAKDIS at their means. col. 3: STRONGDIS 
= 10  and  PACMONEY and  WEAKDIS at  their means. Col. 4: WEAKDIS = 0 and  PACMONEY and 
STRONGDIS at their means. Col. 5: WEAKDIS = 3 and PACMONEY and STRONGDIS at their means. 
higher, ceteris paribus, for members from states where the average number of 
healthy thrifts in a district was higher. The effect of the presence of sick thrifts 
is somewhat ambiguous; though the estimate of p,  is positive, it is much less 
precisely estimated than p,. 
To  get a sense of  the importance of  the thrift constituency variables, we 
used the specification in column  1 of table 6.4  to compute the probability of 
voting yea on the amendment for two types of hypothetical congressmen not 
on the House Banking committee.40  One is a Democrat whose IDEOL has the 
median value for all Democrats (0.745);  the other is a Republican at the me- 
dian of Republican IDEOL (-0.456).  For each of  these congressmen, table 
6.5  shows P,  the estimated probability of voting yea, as the value of  WEAKDIS 
or STRONGDIS varies. 
Not  surprisingly,  P is  generally below  0.5,  reflecting  the  fact  that  the 
amendment lost by a 2:l  majority among noncommittee members. As  noted 
in column (1) of table 6.5,  for our hypothetical Democrat, P = 0.305 when 
PACMONEY, STRONGDIS, and WEAKDIS are at their sample mean values (for the 
Republican, P = 0.394).  Moving from the mean value of  STRONGDIS (= 5) 
to its lowest value in the sample ( = l), increases the probability of a yea vote 
by  about 33%, to P = 0.414.  On the other hand, a change from column (1) 
to a STRONGDIS  = 10  (a change of about two standard deviations from the 
mean) reduces P by about one-third, to P = 0.192.  Changes for the Repub- 
lican are similar, though less pronounced. The table displays similar calcula- 
tions for changes in WEAKDIS, which go in the opposite direction. 
To  summarize,  the  condition of  thrifts  in  the  congressman’s state was 
clearly related to his legislative preferences in voting on the key amendment 
in the recapitalization debate. Because the number of healthy thrifts exceeded 
that of  weak thrifts in most  states (by more than a factor of  two in  many 
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effect, by our estimates, was to reduce the probability of a yea vote in nearly 
all districts. 
There were no comparable roll calls in the Senate. Presuming that similar 
forces operated in that chamber, our findings are consistent with Proxmire’s 
willingness effectively to veto legislation in  1986, and with his intransigence 
throughout the FSLIC debate. In a state with only healthy thrifts, any constit- 
uency pressure he faced on the issue would be in the direction of  delaying 
recapitalization or reducing its level. 
With the defeat of the St Germain amendment, HR  27 was adopted by the 
House, 402 to 6. There were no other controversial amendments to the bill 
reported by the committee. The Senate had also approved its committee’s bill 
(S 790) with only minor changes. This lack of controversy on the floor pro- 
vides additional evidence for our thesis that there was not a significant constit- 
uency for confronting the full magnitude of the thrift problem or to curtail- 
rather than to extend-forbearance.  Even a small group of dissenters can re- 
quire roll call votes. In this way, the dissenters can force their opponents to go 
on record against a position, while the dissenters signify their concern on the 
issue. The virtual absence of roll call votes on the thrift issue in  1986-87  is 
like Sherlock Holmes’s dog that did not bark in the night. It is mute testimony 
to the fact that members of Congress did not believe there was an audience to 
whom it was worth sending stronger signals about the thrift problem.41 
6.4.4  Compromise in Conference: The Competitive Equality Banking Act 
As the House and Senate conference committees prepared to meet to re- 
solve differences between the two bills, administration spokesmen indicated 
that the president was seriously considering a veto of any bill that did not raise 
the recapitalization limit or-more  important-relax  the restraints on non- 
bank banks. As to raising the FSLIC limit, Proxmire “told an industry group 
. . . that the Treasury Department and the bank board are exaggerating the 
urgency of the FSLIC’s problem and that he would not be pressed into quick 
action” (New York  Times, 5 May 1987). 
By  the end of July, as conferees were meeting, the General Accounting 
Office reported that FSLIC was $6 billion in the red and was confronting fu- 
ture claims up to $50 billion. In an agreement with the administration, lead- 
ers of the conference committee agreed to raise the FSLIC borrowing limit to 
$10.8 billion, with not more than $3.75 billion to be raised in any one year. 
The forbearance provisions were left intact. In early August, both chambers 
passed the conference report (the House by  382 to 12 and the Senate by 96 to 
2).42  The president signed the Competitive Equality Banking Act on 10 Au- 
gust 1987. 
The final legislation reinforced continued forbearance by allowing thrifts in 
farm and oil-patch states to continue to use the lenient regulatory accounting 
practices adopted in 1982. Thrifts in these areas (and other areas deemed eco- 
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asset ratio, instead of the 3% required by existing law. The act also explicitly 
reaffirmed the commitment that the “full faith and credit” of the U.S. govern- 
ment stands behind FSLIC. Given the limited amount of new FSLIC funding 
relative to the magnitude of the thrift insolvency problem, the act ensured that 
many failing thrifts would have considerable more time to gamble for resur- 
rection. The crisis would grow. 
6.5  The Thrift Debacle and Beyond 
The policy of forbearance did not, of course, lead to the resurrection of the 
zombie thrifts. Instead, as many economists had warned, the losses incurred 
by thrifts gambling for resurrection continued to escalate. The net income of 
the thrift industry for 1988 was -  $12.0 billion, down from -  $7.8 billion in 
1987. Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley (1989) report that the estimated cost 
of the 205 thrift resolutions begun in 1988 is $31.8 billion. Over half of these 
thrifts had been GAAP-insolvent for more than three years before they were 
closed or merged. At year-end 1988, there were 364 thrifts that were insolvent 
but still open. Many of these thrifts had been insolvent for a long time-some 
for as long as 10 years (Barth, Bartholomew, and Labich 1990). 
Congress did not return to the thrift problem in  1988. By the time the woes 
of  FSLIC reappeared on the legislative agenda after the  1988 elections (in 
which they played little or no role), the costs of delay and forbearance were 
increasingly evident to nearly everyone. The 1989 “bailout” (Financial Insti- 
tutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, or FIRREA) was enacted in 
the context of predictions that the liabilities facing FSLIC were expected to 
exceed $200 billion.43  The FIRREA and its legislative history are beyond the 
scope of this paper. But its enactment was necessitated by the legislative fail- 
ures of the previous five years. 
While it is now widely recognized that a policy of  forbearance under the 
existing structure of  deposit insurance has been a prime contributor to the 
escalation of the thrift debacle, the political foundations for this behavior are 
not  as widely appreciated. This paper has pointed to these foundations as 
being rooted in the logic of  the connections between elected officials and 
regulatory policy. By  this view,  regulatory agencies are viewed not as au- 
tonomous decision makers, but as actors closely tied to the political system. 
Constituency pressures work on regulators through the (often implicit) con- 
nections with politicians. 
The legislative response to the problems of the thrift industry in the 1980s 
is an excellent example of how this process works. In summary, we note the 
following: 
1. The political process provides at least tacit support for regulatory policy 
when the policy is consistent with the preferences of  active constituent groups. 
This characterized policy toward thrifts until the late 1970s. 
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stituency pressures for regulatory change. This change may be initiated by the 
regulatory agency, but to be sustainable, it must meet congressional and pres- 
idential approval. The 1982 legislative response to the erosion of thrift prof- 
itability-deregulation  coupled with forbearance for sick thrifts-can  be seen 
in this light. 
3.  Regulatory change that is resisted by active constituencies and not sup- 
ported by other active  constituencies  rarely succeeds. In  1985 the FHLBB 
appeared to be deviating from its earlier course. The 1986 stalemate in refi- 
nancing FSLIC and the 1987 legislation worked-through  delay, direct inter- 
vention, and explicit limitation on FSLIC resources-to  rein in the FHLBB. 
The president, because he can command national attention, is the primary 
political actor with the power to counter narrow constituency pressure. In the 
case of  the thrifts, the president opted for a stance that did not oppose the 
congressional tendency toward forbearance. 
4. The emergence of constituencies for whom an issue becomes more salient 
can alter legislative policy preferences.  As the scale of  insolvencies grew, 
depositor concern over FSLIC solvency also mounted. By late 1988, the pol- 
icy preferences of  the insolvent thrifts (in favor of  continued forbearance) 
were more strongly opposed by concerns about the viability of deposit insur- 
ance guarantees. As our empirical results on the St Germain amendment sug- 
gest, this would lead to an increase in support for larger levels of FSLIC cap- 
italization. Moreover,  once the required funding exceeded an amount that 
could be covered mostly by  assessments on the industry (around $15420 
billion  over five years),  healthy  thrifts would no longer oppose additional 
amounts. The financing costs of  such increments would come from general 
revenues;  deposit  guarantees  financed  in  this  way  would  benefit  healthy 
thrifts. 
6.5.1  Information and Policy Choice 
It  is  sobering to  note  that  the  political  behavior  surrounding the thrift 
debacle is absolutely ordinary. Through 1988, congressmen behaved as they 
do  in  ordinary circumstances: paying  solicitous attention to  active,  well- 
organized interests, provided that the readily apparent costs to their other con- 
stituents are not noticeably high. 
It is an intriguing question whether congressmen would have acted differ- 
ently had they “really known” in 1986 that delay, forbearance, and interven- 
tion would lead to a $400 billion (or more) debacle. If by “really known,” we 
mean that there was a widely shared consensus held by broad constituencies, 
then the answer to the question would probably be yes. But this was not the 
situation. It  is no doubt correct to say that any economist who thought seri- 
ously about the situation would have seen that the combination of forbearance 
and deposit insurance was a recipe for disaster. Some economists actually said 
so, within the regulatory agency and outside it. 
But the more widespread belief, reinforced by constituency pressures, was 
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large extent, of course, this perception was created by the very process of the 
forbearance that politically endorsed policies made possible. Accounting pro- 
cedures and regulatory reporting effectively minimized the magnitude of the 
losses. This put most congressmen in the position of “not knowing” the con- 
sequences of forbearance. The lack of an active constituency against forbear- 
ance (together with knowledge that agencies often cry “wolf”) allowed con- 
gressmen to  act  in  standard ways; namely, to intervene in  the regulatory 
process on behalf of  their constituents. Thus, even in the face of  the GAO 
predictions that FSLIC was facing a $50 billion problem in 1987, nothing near 
this level of recapitalization was ever on the political agenda in that year. Nor 
was there any consideration of restructuring the guarantees under deposit in- 
surance. 
6.5.2  Beyond the Thrift Debacle 
Given the nature of incentives facing politicians, it is extremely difficult for 
Congress to deal at a sufficiently early state with emerging policy problems 
that may turn into catastrophes if left unattended. Unless they can claim credit 
for actions to stem the crisis today, congressmen face great difficulties  in buck- 
ing the current set of interest group forces. Perversely, even when congress- 
men know that policy crises are emerging, they may have to wait for the crisis 
to occur before they can take and be rewarded for remedial actions. Part of the 
foundation for this tendency is that individual legislators are not seen by their 
voters as playing a role in the problem. They are not penalized for letting the 
problem grow. 
These considerations are particularly relevant because many aspects of the 
thrift debacle appear now to be replicated in several other financial problems 
that loom on the congressional horizon-the  solvency of commercial banks, 
farm loan guarantee programs, and various government-guaranteed pension 
systems.”  If  the wrong lessons are drawn from the thnft debacle, similar 
crises may reappear in new settings. 
It is tempting to explain the thrift debacle as a story about greed, fraud, and 
criminal behavior. Surely these are part of the story. It is also tempting to 
argue that this was a case of  regulators in bed with the industry they were 
supposed to oversee. This certainly also played a role. But underlying these 
factors is the essential component: Congress sanctioned regulatory forbear- 
ance and actively intervened when regulators sought a new,  more restrictive 
path. 
In order to argue that the next potential crisis would unfold differently, one 
would need to demonstrate that structure or incentives have  changed. It is 
possible that, in commercial banking, for example, healthy firms will behave 
differently than such firms did in the thrift industry. They may perceive that 
early action to deal effectively with insolvencies is in the long-run interest of 
the rest of the industry. But it is also possible that, in each case, the regulated 
interests will remain major constituents of politicians and will argue against 
forceful reg~lators.~~  Will politicians be more wary? The answer to this de- 204  Thomas Romer and Barry R. Weingast 
pends on the degree to which currently diffuse interests-generally,  taxpayers 
as a group-see  their representatives as having played a major role in  the 
crisis. By moving the focus to shifty operators in the industry or by blaming 
incompetent or biased regulators, the political source of the crisis will be ob- 
scured. 
Notes 
1.  We  will  sacrifice some  precision  and  use  the  terms  “savings and  loan”  and 
“thrift” interchangeably  to mean  federally insured thrift institutions (which include 
both S&Ls and some mutual savings banks). 
2.  The Wall Street Journal  reported  on 6 April  1990 that Congressional Budget 
Office and General Accounting Office projections of spending through the 1990s will 
be  between $300 billion and $350 billion,  “before factoring in  increased net losses 
from an unexpectedly greater number of [thrift] insolvencies” (emphasis in original). 
The article quotes estimates by close observers of the industry that the likely 10-year 
cost will exceed $400 billion. 
3.  By  1981,  market-value  net  worth  of  federally  insured  thrifts  had  fallen  to 
-  17.3% of total assets (Brumbaugh 1988, 50, table 2-7). 
4.  In  1982 nearly  10 percent of  FSLIC-insured thrifts were insolvent by  GAAP 
standards, more than in any prior year (Brumbaugh 1988, 37, fig. 2-1). 
5. Prior  to  the  Garn-St  Germain  Act,  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board 
(FHLBB) had eased some accounting rules to help ailing thrifts, by lengthening the list 
of items that could be excluded as liabilities and those included as assets, in computing 
net worth. Under Garn-St  Germain, “well-managed” thrifts with net worth between 
0.5% and 3% of assets could issue “net worth certificates” that could be exchanged for 
FSLIC promissory notes and counted as assets. In this way a thrift institution could 
convert what was, in effect, a liability into an asset. Moreover, once FSLIC agreed to 
buy such certificates from an institution, it was committed to continue buying them as 
long as the institution was deemed to be “well-managed.’’ 
6. A typical report, carried in the 13 August 1983 issue of National Journal, pro- 
claimed that Garn-St  Germain had “rescued” the thrift industry and that thrift execu- 
tives were optimistic about their new options. 
7.  Kane (1989b) provides a good overview of the first and third of these hypotheses. 
Explanations that lean heavily on fraud and skulduggery are presented in a spate of 
“inside story” books: e.g., Adams (1989), Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo (1989), Pilzer 
and Dietz (1989). Movie versions cannot be far behind. 
8.  Our discussion is based on a large and growing literature on this topic: Fiorina 
(1981),  Fiorina  and  No11  (1978),  Ferejohn  and  Shipan  (1989),  McCubbins  and 
Schwartz (1984), Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), McCubbins,  Noll, and Weingast 
(1989), Moe (1985a, 1989), Weingast (1984), and Weingast and Moran (1983). For a 
survey of some of this work, see Romer and Rosenthal(l987). 
9.  On recognition, see Jacobson (1987). 
10. This line of work has provided insights into equilibrium and comparative stat- 
ics, applied in a variety of  settings. See, e.g., Romer and Rosenthal(1978), Weingast 
and Moran (1983), Ferejohn (1986), Ferejohn and Shipan (1989), and Kiewiet and 
McCubbins (1991). 
11.  This is emphasized in Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast (1989). 205  Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle 
12. On the role of the House leadership in the 1980s, see Sinclair (1989). 
13.  This  argument  is  based  on McCubbins  and  Schwartz  (1984) and  Weingast 
(1984). On oversight, see also Aberbach (1990) and Ogul and Rockman (1990). 
14. See Kiewiet and McCubbins’s (1991) discussion of delegation and Ferejohn and 
Shipan (1989) on the legislative threats of intervention in agency decisions. 
15. See Weingast (1984) for a review of the literature and evidence for this claim. 
16.  Other examples abound. See esp. Ferejohn and Shipan’s (1989) study of Fed- 
eral Communications Commission policies after the AT&T divestiture and Weingast 
and Moran’s (1983) study of the rise and fall of consumer activism by the Federal 
Trade Commission. 
17. Thrifts had objected to the federal mortgage insurance provisions of the Hous- 
ing Act, fearing that they would increase the ability of commercial banks and insurance 
companies to compete in the mortgage market.  On this, and for other details of the 
history of the thrift industry, see Woerheide (1984). 
18. This arrangement  differed from the case of  the FDIC, which was made an 
agency independent of the Federal Reserve Board. 
19.  The economic argument for subsidies to mortgage lenders as a way to encour- 
age demand for housing is a weak one and had been frequently challenged-by  econ- 
omists,  if  not  by  developers  and  thrift  institutions;  see e.g.,  Meltzer  (1981)  and 
Weicher (1988). 
20.  Robert Litan’s comments (in this volume) provide some details on regulatory 
developments before 1982. 
21.  Since the early days of deposit insurance, economists had pointed to the per- 
verse incentives for bank risk taking that it created. Barth and Bradley (1988) quote 
observers from 1931 and 1936 on this point. By the early 1980s, some FHLBB econo- 
mists were warning about the riskiness of allowing zombie thrifts to operate, and those 
outside the industry were calling attention to this problem as well; see Kane (1985, 
1989b). 
22.  In the  1986 Economic Report  of  the President,  for example, the president’s 
report itself (as distinct from that of the CEA) carried the message that continued de- 
regulation of  financial institutions should proceed apace. The thrifts were not men- 
tioned. 
23.  This quote is taken from an Associated Press dispatch filed by Martin Crutsin- 
ger, 26 July 1985; see the analysis in Barth et al. (1985a, 1985b) and Brumbaugh and 
Hemmel(l984). 
24.  Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 are based on year-end data, using GAAP definitions. 
25.  Their position,  as described by banking consultant Bert Ely, was, “After all, 
Ford and GM didn’t bail out Chrysler. Boeing didn’t bail out Lockheed (Wull Street 
Journal, 22 July 1987). 
26.  Given the economic status of the  thrifts, even a $15 billion recapitalization 
would have required assessments of over $1 billion per year and would have cut se- 
verely into the income of  the segment of the industry that was healthy in  1986. By 
1987, tangible net worth (GAAP net worth minus certain items such as goodwill) of 
the industry had shrunk to $9 billion. Thrifts with GAAP capital-to-asset ratio above 
3% had tangible net worth of $34 billion. Tangible net worth of the rest of the industry 
was negative $25 billion (Barth et al. 1990, table 1). 
27.  Congressional deadlocks of this sort can sometimes be broken by presidential 
intervention. This did not occur, as the administration was willing to acquiesce in the 
existing policy of forbearance. 
28.  Kane (1989b) provides a good discussion of the extent to which accounting 
numbers systematically provided rosy pictures of the thrift situation. 
29.  The lobbying and campaign financing activities of  thrift industry groups and 
individual thrifts on this issue have been well documented; see, e.g., Jackson (1988). 206  Thomas Romer and Barry R. Weingast 
30.  Although we refer to FSLIC borrowing, under all of the plans discussed here 
the actual borrowing was to be done by a newly created financing corporation (FICO). 
The principal on the borrowed amounts would be secured by zero-coupon bonds issued 
by the Treasury. Interest on FICO borrowing would be paid by FSLIC-insured thrifts. 
31.  The day before Wright’s announcement of his support for the $15 billion limit, 
the FHLBB “filed a $350 million lawsuit against seven former officers of the Vernon 
Savings and Loan Association of  Dallas charging them with looting the organization 
of hundreds of millions of dollars. Vernon was one of the thrift institutions for which 
Mr. Wright had sought leniency” (New  York Times, 29 April 1987). 
32.  The St Germain amendment is CQ Roll Call 83. Democrats voted 81 yea and 
160 nay; Republicans voted 72 yea and 98 nay. 
33. The categories are: (GAAP net worth/GAAP assets) less than 0; between 0 and 
1.5%,  between 1.5%  and 3%; between 3% and 6%;  and over 6%. 
34.  Using year-end  1987 data instead did not af€ect our qualitative results, nor did 
defining WEAK as thrifts with GAAP net worth less than  1.5% of GAAP assets or 
STRONG as those with GAAP net worth above 6%. 
35.  The PACs are those affiliated with the U.S.  Savings League and with the Na- 
tional Council of Savings Institutions (Thriftpac). These were the only two thrift PACs 
among the 500 largest (in terms of campaign contributions) PACs in  1985-86. The 
totals do not include “soft money” or honoraria received by congressmen from thrift 
industry groups. 
36.  We thank Keith Poole for the data. The IDEOL variable for each congressman 
equals the coordinate of the first dimension estimated from running two-dimensional 
NOMINATE on the 100th House. The IDEOL variable correlates highly (over .9) with the 
more familiar ADA score, but is based on a much wider set of roll calls. For details, 
see Poole and Rosenthal(l991). 
37.  This could be more directly tested with a variable that measured the number of 
depositors with accounts at insolvent thrifts in the district. We did not have such a 
variable at our disposal. 
38.  That this may have involved strategic voting by at least some committee mem- 
bers has not escaped our attention. All members who, in committee, had voted to keep 
the borrowing limit at $15 billion, voted for the St Germain amendment on the floor. 
Five members (including St Germain) who had voted to reduce the limit from $15 
billion to $5 billion in committee, switched their position and voted for the St Germain 
amendment on the floor. 
39.  It should be recalled that PACMONEY is an imprecise and almost certainly under- 
stated measure of actual contributions (see  n. 35 above). It is not clear how the “true” 
measure and our measure would be correlated. 
40. Column 1 of table 6.4  is the specification that follows directly from our discus- 
sion. Likelihood-ratio tests of comparisons with the results of the other columns also 
argue in favor of the col. 1 specification. 
41. In 1986 there was one roll call vote in the House dealing with thrifts; there were 
none in the Senate. In 1987, aside from final passage, there were two roll call votes on 
HR 27 in the House and two on S  790 in the Senate. 
42.  At first, the U.S. Savings League announced that it would oppose the compro- 
mise, saying that the borrowing limit was excessive. Given the GAO report, however, 
it was unlikely that many congressmen would have been willing to reopen the issue for 
a major floor fight. Final passage of the bill in the House did require a parliamentary 
manoeuvre.  “Because the conference report broke new ground, beyond the scope of 
either the House or Senate’s original bills, it was vulnerable to a point of order on the 
House floor. St Germain appealed to the Rules Committee for a waiver of this and 
other procedural points that might have deterred final passage. In the end, the Rules 
Committee granted the waivers on a voice vote” (Congressional Quarterly 1988,636). 207  Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle 
43.  Some observers have noted that FIRREA does not address many of the funda- 
mental problems facing the industry (see, e.g., Barth and  Brumbaugh 1990; Scott 
1989b). 
44. Commercial banks are the most directly related concern. See Starobin (1989) 
and Brumbaugh, Carron, and Litan (1989). 
45.  As of this writing, congressmen from New England have called bank regulators 
to task for being too vigorous in dealing with commercial banks with weak balance 
sheets (Wall Street Journal,  12 April  1990). While gratifyingly consistent with our 
thesis, such a development hardly bodes well for taxpayers in the 1990s. 
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Comment  Robert E. Litan 
Thomas Romer and Barry R. Weingast join the growing industry of econo- 
mists, journalists, and now  political scientists who have been attempting to 
explain the worst financial crisis since the  1930s: the thrift disaster of  the 
1980s. The entry of political scientists into this fray is welcome. For Romer 
and Weingast are correct when they argue that the fundamental causes of the 
thrift mess are political rather than economic or criminal. 
Not that economics or flagrant abuse of the law have not mattered, because 
they  have.  The  lifting of  the  deposit insurance  ceiling from  $40,000  to 
$100,000 in 1980 contributed to the massive risk-taking in the thrift industry 
that occurred thereafter. The flat-rate feature of  deposit insurance pricing, 
which allowed the drunk drivers of the system to pay no more for their insur- 
ance then the safe drivers, also played a part. And the number of books and 
articles on the rampant insider abuses and fraud among thrift owners and man- 
agers clearly demonstrate that criminal activity played a role as well. 
Robert E. Litan is a senior fellow and the Director of Economic Progress and Employment at 
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But each of these explanations raises still additional questions. Take deposit 
insurance, for example. While I have been among those who have argued that 
the banking industry is in poorer health than reported either by  the banks 
themselves or by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (Brum- 
baugh and Litan 1990), no responsible observer claims that the cost of actual 
or hidden bank failures has been even close in magnitude to the costs of re- 
solving the thrift crisis. Yet the deposit insurance system for banks and thrifts 
has been identical (but for a somewhat higher differential in the flat-rate insur- 
ance premium for thrifts since 1985). How then can deposit insurance be the 
sole cause of the thrift problem, as certain would-be reformers of deposit in- 
surance implicitly, if not explicitly, claim.? 
Meanwhile, although fraud and insider abuse appears to have contributed 
to many,  if  not most, thrift insolvencies, there are no reliable estimates to 
indicate what portion of the cleanup cost is due to criminal activity. My own 
guess-and  it is just that-is  that the figure is 20% or below. Others certainly 
will have different intuitions. 
But the exact figure does not matter because, in my opinion, there is a more 
fundamental reason why  so much criminal or near-criminal activity appar- 
ently took place, as well as why deposit insurance for thrifts in particular 
turned out to be so disastrous. That reason was the virtual abandonment of 
capital standards by thrift regulators who not only formally lowered required 
capital-to-asset ratios in the early 1980s, but who also introduced new regu- 
latory accounting principles (RAP) that effectively allowed failed thrifts to 
hide their insolvency. Romer and Weingast, as well as others, are also correct 
to point to the utterly senseless refusal by the Office of Management and Bud- 
get in  the mid-1980s to increase the number of thrift supervisors precisely 
when they were needed most: that is, after the congressional  decision in 1982 
to broaden thrift asset powers. This action, too, had the effect of abolishing 
capital regulation for many thrifts. 
It is now well recognized that the decision to let thrift operators play with 
federally insured deposits, but with little of their own money, was like throw- 
ing a lighted match into a pool of gasoline.' But it is less well understood that, 
by  abandoning meaningful capital regulation, thrift regulators virtually in- 
vited high rollers and crooks into the industry. Had capital standards been 
enforced, few of  the Donald Dixons (Vernon Savings and Loan of  Texas), 
Charles Keatings (Lincoln Savings and Loan of  Arizona), and David Pauls 
(Centrust Savings and Loan of Florida) would have ever bought thrifts. 
In short, capital deregulation in my  view lies at the bottom of the thrift 
disaster. But,  then,  this explanation too simply leads to another question. 
Why did  thrift regulators, but not their bank counterparts, effectively gut 
1. This point has now been so heavily discussed that one hesitates to single out any particular 
authors who have advanced it. Nevertheless, a small sample of the  literature includes: Benston 
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preexisting capital standards? Or, to put the question in somewhat more polit- 
ical terms, why did regulators and Congress wait for so long to put insolvent 
institutions out of business? 
Romer and Weingast tells us that the answer is simple: Congress was behav- 
ing in a business-as-usual mode by encouraging regulatory forbearance, not 
only in now-celebrated particular cases (the Vernon  and Lincoln S&Ls, for 
example) but in a systemic fashion by denying FSLIC sufficient funds to clean 
the insolvent institutions out of the industry. 
Stripped to its essentials, the Romer/Weingast story is one we find over and 
over again in public policy circles. A narrow constituency, in this case the 
thrift industry, strongly wants a policy outcome, the costs of which are widely 
diffused throughout the economy. Congress then adopts the policy, in this case 
forbearance, largely by ignoring the problem and entrusting its resolution to 
its own narrow specialists, members of the banking committees. 
Of  course, Romer and Weingast tell a fuller story, embellishing it with an 
interesting econometric demonstration of the important role played not only 
by insolvent thrifts, who of course wanted forbearance in their own particular 
cases, but also by healthy thrifts, who feared that they would have to pay for 
the cleanup and thus encouraged their legislators to deny the thrift insurance 
fund of all the resources it required. 
My only significant quarrel with Romer and Weingast is that by focusing so 
heavily on congressional and regulatory forbearance in the mid- 1980s they 
provide an incomplete analysis of their topic-the  “political foundations of 
the thrift debacle.” 
In fact, there were two stages to the thrift debacle of the 1980s, which, as 
Edward Kane (1989) has demonstrated, can be usefully analogized to a mas- 
sive oil spill. Like the Exxon spill that dumped millions of barrels of oil onto 
the Alaska coastline, the first stage of the thrift crisis occurred when double- 
digit interest rates in the early 1980s caused thrifts to spill billions of dollars 
of red ink onto the financial landscape-by  several estimates, over $100 bil- 
lion in present value. But unlike the relatively rapid cleanup of the oil spill, 
the administration and the regulators did not ask for the funds, nor did the 
Congress voluntarily supply the funds, for cleaning up the initial thrift spill. 
Romer and Weingast do not directly answer this question-prefemng  in- 
stead to concentrate on later stages of the crisis in the mid-eighties-but  the 
answers are straightforward. To  have “cleaned up” the initial thrift spill would 
not only have cost far more money than anyone at the time was  willing to 
spend, but it would have required the liquidation or assisted merger of most 
thrifts. At that time, few believed that effective substitutes for financing home 
ownership existed. The mortgage-backed securities market was growing, but 
it was not then as well developed as it eventually has become. In any event, 
even if all new mortgages could then have been securitized, it is highly doubt- 
ful that without some institutions dedicated primarily to buying those mort- 
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gages that they  would  have been  fully absorbed by  other buyers  (pension 
funds, insurance companies and banks). All of these reasons help explain why 
Congress and regulators essentially chose to gamble on interest rates coming 
down, which eventually they did, rather than either shrinking the industry or, 
less radically, not permitting it to grow. 
Nor do Romer and Weingast discuss in detail the political foundations of 
why the first thrift spill happened in the first place.  Part of  the answer, of 
course, lies in the Regulation Q deposit interest ceilings, whose origins could 
have been usefully explored. But Regulation Q applied to banks first, and, as 
I have already noted, banks did not get into nearly as deep a mess as thrifts in 
the 1980s. The reason, of  course, is that banks have been free to invest in 
assets of varying maturities as well as to lend at floating rates. 
In contrast, thrifts have been locked into long-term mortgages, which, until 
the early  1980s, had to be  at fixed rates (except for certain state-chartered 
thrifts, such as those in California, that were permitted to extend adjustable 
rate mortgages in the 1970s). One of the great policy mistakes of the 1970s 
that Romer and Weingast should have given more emphasis was that Congress 
essentially refused to consider thrift industry proposals (as well as those of the 
industry’s regulator, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) to permit the exten- 
sion of adjustable-rate mortgages: this would have dramatically reduced the 
magnitude of the initial thrift crisis of the early 1980s. By the logic advanced 
in  the RomedWeingast paper-wherein  thrifts always get their way-this 
should not have happened. But it did because of heavy opposition from con- 
sumer groups. 
The strength of  the Romer and Weingast paper, as I have said, is that it 
focuses on what happened after the first thrift spill, or, using the oil spill anal- 
ogy,  why Congress and the regulators delayed cleaning up the initial thrift 
spill even  after the “oil” turned  toxic.  Not  only  did thrifts have a single- 
minded interest in forbearance, but politicians could reasonably assume that 
there would be no immediate or near-term (two years for a Representative, or 
even six years for a Senator) costs to a forbearance policy. After all, depositors 
were protected against all losses, both by the formal deposit insurance system 
and, in the case of the larger thrift institutions, by the “too big to fail” doctrine 
implicitly developed by federal regulators when they protected uninsured de- 
positors of Continental Illinois Bank in  1984. During the  1984-88  period, 
given the administration’s adamant opposition to higher taxes, there also was 
little immediate or even intermediate-run prospect that taxpayers would suffer 
from forbearance. Finally, politicians could ignore warnings by the few econ- 
omists, and eventually by  FHLBB Chairman Ed Gray, that the FSLIC fund 
was effectively bankrupt by arguing that the problems thrifts were experienc- 
ing would be temporary. After all, had not the doomsayers who had pointed 
to the $100 billion-plus market value insolvency of  the industry in .the early 
1980s been  proved wrong by  the subsequent drop in  interest rates, which 
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Eventually, however, the toxic effects of the thrift spill became too large for 
even healthy thrifts and banks to ignore. Of course, by then the cleanup costs 
were also too large for them to pay,  so with a free conscience they could 
presumably advocate a massive cleanup effort. But it is far from clear that this 
was why the Bank Board and then the new Bush administration finally began 
to attack the thrift problem with vigor. My simple-minded explanation is that 
eventually the press became convinced that the economists who had  been 
warning about the  immense magnitude of  the problem had  been  right all 
along, which helped force the new administration into doing something ma- 
jor, at least after the 1988 Presidential election was over. In addition, by ex- 
tending roughly $40 billion in  government guarantees to buyers of  failed 
thrifts in the 1988, Danny Wall (the chairman of the FNLBB at the time) also 
helped force Congress and the new administration confront the mess. The size 
of the expenditure, coupled with the off-budget way in which it was made, 
literally embarrassed both  branches  of  government into  going  about  the 
cleanup in a more straightforward way. As a reader I would have liked to have 
seen Romer and Weingast spend a little more time explaining why they think 
Congress and the administration  backed off forbearance when they did. 
Finally, I would have liked to see Romer and  Weingast attempt to apply 
their logic to both predicting how,  if at all, Congress will attempt to reform 
the system to prevent future “thrift spills.” At a minimum, their paper persua- 
sively suggests the broad outlines of what should be done. 
We  now know what happens when business-as-usual politics confronts a 
major crisis: defenders of the status quo will prevent an immediate solution to 
the problem as long as no one feels the costs of not addressing it (or the costs 
of not doing so are diffused broadly throughout the population). Armed with 
this knowledge, it  surely makes sense to develop mechanisms for forcing 
much earlier action to be taken when depository institutions get into trouble, 
but before  they become insolvent.* One possible approach is to require regu- 
lators to intervene early and to base their judgment on more realistic market- 
based  measures of  the  financial condition of  institutions (Benston et al., 
1989). A supplement, or alternative, is to rely more heavily on market mech- 
anisms, whether discipline by  depositors, holders of  subordinated debt, or 
private deposit insurers. 
I realize this is not the forum in which to debate the relative strengths and 
weakness of these alternative proposals. The concluding question that I would 
like to raise here is, What do Romer and Weingast believe their political anal- 
ysis has to say about which, if any, are likely to be adopted? My own forecast, 
2. Earlier action would surely mitigate losses to  the insurance funds. In the  1980s the FDIC lost 
approximately 12 cents per  dollar of recorded assets on failed banks. Since 1986, the thrift insur- 
ance fund (first the FSLIC and then later the Savings Association Insurance Fund of the FDIC) 
has lost more than 30 cents per  dollar. These loss figures demonstrate that, by the time the capital 
of a depository institution, measured at  book  value, falls below zero, the  market value of the 
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based on my  inside-the-Beltway knowledge and intuition, is that, first, given 
the huge dimensions of the thrift problem and the certainty that more money 
will have to be authorized to solve it, Treasury will recommend and in  1991 
or 1992 that Congress adopt significant reforms in deposit insurance. These 
will include: (1) authority for the FDIC to introduce risk-sensitive pricing of 
deposit insurance premiums; (2) some variation of the American Bankers As- 
sociation proposal requiring mandatory “haircuts” on uninsured deposits; and 
(3) authorization for regulators to assume conservatorship of troubled deposi- 
tories before they become insolvent. 
Without discussing the merits of any specific proposal, I believe that, in 
combination, the set of reforms I have just described would force regulators 
to act much earlier than they do now to assume conservatorship or to force the 
merger of troubled depositories. I hope that Romer and Weingast in their fu- 
ture work lend their considerable talents to forecasting whether the political 
system that brought us the thrift crisis can ever help prevent another, and, if 
so, how. 
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